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HFEPX · Eval paper review

RuleForge: Automated Generation and Validation for Web Vulnerability Detection at Scale

Ayush Garg, Sophia Hager, Jacob Montiel, Aditya Tiwari +4 more

Published

Apr 2, 2026

Citations

0

Trust level

Moderate

Usefulness score

77/100 (High)

Extraction confidence

70% (Moderate)

Derived from extracted protocol signals and abstract evidence.

Rater population

Domain Experts

Signals refreshed

Apr 2, 2026

Should you rely on this paper?

This paper has strong direct human-feedback and evaluation protocol signal and is suitable as a primary eval pipeline reference.

Use this for comparison and orientation, not as your only source.

Best use

Primary protocol reference for eval design

Use if you need

A secondary eval reference to pair with stronger protocol papers.

What to verify

Validate the evaluation procedure and quality controls in the full paper before operational use.

Main weakness

No major weakness surfaced.

Human feedback signal
Detected
From extracted signals
Evaluation signal
Detected
Eval setup described
Usefulness for eval research
77/100
High-confidence candidate

Use this as a primary source when designing or comparing eval protocols.

Abstract

Security teams face a challenge: the volume of newly disclosed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) far exceeds the capacity to manually develop detection mechanisms. In 2025, the National Vulnerability Database published over 48,000 new vulnerabilities, motivating the need for automation. We present RuleForge, an AWS internal system that automatically generates detection rules--JSON-based patterns that identify malicious HTTP requests exploiting specific vulnerabilities--from structured Nuclei templates describing CVE details. Nuclei templates provide standardized, YAML-based vulnerability descriptions that serve as the structured input for our rule generation process. This paper focuses on RuleForge's architecture and operational deployment for CVE-related threat detection, with particular emphasis on our novel LLM-as-a-judge (Large Language Model as judge) confidence validation system and systematic feedback integration mechanism. This validation approach evaluates candidate rules across two dimensions--sensitivity (avoiding false negatives) and specificity (avoiding false positives)--achieving AUROC of 0.75 and reducing false positives by 67% compared to synthetic-test-only validation in production. Our 5x5 generation strategy (five parallel candidates with up to five refinement attempts each) combined with continuous feedback loops enables systematic quality improvement. We also present extensions enabling rule generation from unstructured data sources and demonstrate a proof-of-concept agentic workflow for multi-event-type detection. Our lessons learned highlight critical considerations for applying LLMs to cybersecurity tasks, including overconfidence mitigation and the importance of domain expertise in both prompt design and quality review of generated rules through human-in-the-loop validation.

What we could verify

These are the protocol signals we could actually recover from the available paper metadata. Use them to decide whether this paper is worth deeper reading.

Human Feedback Types

strong

Expert Verification

Directly usable for protocol triage.

"Security teams face a challenge: the volume of newly disclosed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) far exceeds the capacity to manually develop detection mechanisms."

Evaluation Modes

strong

Llm As Judge, Automatic Metrics

Includes extracted eval setup.

"Security teams face a challenge: the volume of newly disclosed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) far exceeds the capacity to manually develop detection mechanisms."

Quality Controls

missing

Not reported

No explicit QC controls found.

"Security teams face a challenge: the volume of newly disclosed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) far exceeds the capacity to manually develop detection mechanisms."

Benchmarks / Datasets

missing

Not extracted

No benchmark anchors detected.

"Security teams face a challenge: the volume of newly disclosed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) far exceeds the capacity to manually develop detection mechanisms."

Reported Metrics

strong

Auroc

Useful for evaluation criteria comparison.

"This validation approach evaluates candidate rules across two dimensions--sensitivity (avoiding false negatives) and specificity (avoiding false positives)--achieving AUROC of 0.75 and reducing false positives by 67% compared to synthetic-test-only validation in production."

Rater Population

strong

Domain Experts

Helpful for staffing comparability.

"Our lessons learned highlight critical considerations for applying LLMs to cybersecurity tasks, including overconfidence mitigation and the importance of domain expertise in both prompt design and quality review of generated rules through human-in-the-loop validation."

Benchmarks and datasets

No benchmark or dataset names were extracted from the available abstract.

Reported metrics

auroc
Human feedback details
Uses human feedback
Yes
Feedback types
Expert Verification
Rater population
Domain Experts
Expertise required
Math
Evaluation details
Evaluation modes
Llm As Judge, Automatic Metrics
Agentic eval
None
Quality controls
Not reported
Evidence quality
Moderate
Use this page as
Primary protocol reference for eval design

Research brief

Metadata summary

Security teams face a challenge: the volume of newly disclosed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) far exceeds the capacity to manually develop detection mechanisms.

Based on abstract + metadata only. Check the source paper before making high-confidence protocol decisions.

Key takeaways

  • Security teams face a challenge: the volume of newly disclosed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) far exceeds the capacity to manually develop detection mechanisms.
  • In 2025, the National Vulnerability Database published over 48,000 new vulnerabilities, motivating the need for automation.
  • We present RuleForge, an AWS internal system that automatically generates detection rules--JSON-based patterns that identify malicious HTTP requests exploiting specific vulnerabilities--from structured Nuclei templates describing CVE details.

Researcher actions

  • Compare this paper against nearby papers in the same arXiv category before using it for protocol decisions.
  • Check the full text for explicit evaluation design choices (raters, protocol, and metrics).
  • Use related-paper links to find stronger protocol-specific references.

Caveats

  • Generated from abstract + metadata only; no PDF parsing.
  • Signals below are heuristic and may miss details reported outside the abstract.

Recommended queries

Contribution summary

  • We present RuleForge, an AWS internal system that automatically generates detection rules--JSON-based patterns that identify malicious HTTP requests exploiting specific vulnerabilities--from structured Nuclei templates describing CVE…
  • This paper focuses on RuleForge's architecture and operational deployment for CVE-related threat detection, with particular emphasis on our novel LLM-as-a-judge (Large Language Model as judge) confidence validation system and systematic…
  • We also present extensions enabling rule generation from unstructured data sources and demonstrate a proof-of-concept agentic workflow for multi-event-type detection.

Why it matters for eval

  • This paper focuses on RuleForge's architecture and operational deployment for CVE-related threat detection, with particular emphasis on our novel LLM-as-a-judge (Large Language Model as judge) confidence validation system and systematic…
  • We also present extensions enabling rule generation from unstructured data sources and demonstrate a proof-of-concept agentic workflow for multi-event-type detection.

Researcher checklist

  • Human feedback protocol is explicit

    Detected: Expert Verification

  • Evaluation mode is explicit

    Detected: Llm As Judge, Automatic Metrics

  • Quality control reporting appears

    No calibration/adjudication/IAA control explicitly detected.

  • Benchmark or dataset anchors are present

    No benchmark/dataset anchor extracted from abstract.

  • Metric reporting is present

    Detected: auroc