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HFEPX · Eval paper review

MUSE: A Run-Centric Platform for Multimodal Unified Safety Evaluation of Large Language Models

Zhongxi Wang, Yueqian Lin, Jingyang Zhang, Zinuo Cheng +2 more

Published

Mar 3, 2026

Citations

0

Trust level

Low

Usefulness score

25/100 (Low)

Extraction confidence

45% (Low)

Derived from extracted protocol signals and abstract evidence.

Rater population

Not reported

Signals refreshed

Aug 31, 2026

Should you rely on this paper?

This paper is adjacent to HFEPX scope and is best used for background context, not as a primary protocol reference.

Use this as background context only. Do not make protocol decisions from this page alone.

Best use

Background context only

Use if you need

A secondary eval reference to pair with stronger protocol papers.

What to verify

Validate the evaluation procedure and quality controls in the full paper before operational use.

Main weakness

The available metadata is too thin to trust this as a primary source.

Human feedback signal
Not explicit
Not explicit in abstract metadata
Evaluation signal
Detected
Eval setup described
Usefulness for eval research
25/100
Adjacent candidate

Treat as adjacent context, not a core eval-method reference.

Abstract

Safety evaluation of multimodal large language models requires tracking not only whether an attack succeeds, but also how the interaction unfolds across turns and input modalities. We present MUSE (Multimodal Unified Safety Evaluation), an open-source, browser-based, run-centric platform for multimodal safety evaluation. MUSE treats each attack run as the persistent unit of execution, inspection, and analysis, preserving its configuration, multi-turn trajectory, delivered modalities and media, target responses, and safety judgments. A five-level response taxonomy further distinguishes full Compliance from Partial Compliance and refusal behavior, yielding hard ASR, soft ASR, and gray-zone width (GZW). Across 11,700 evaluations on six multimodal LLMs, direct text-only requests yield only 3.1% macro hard ASR and 4.4% soft ASR, while iterative attack procedures are substantially more effective. Attack effectiveness also varies substantially with the attacker backbone. In contrast, Inter-Turn Modality Switching (ITMS), evaluated as a controlled delivery-modality probe, does not consistently increase attack success. These results demonstrate the value of run-centric, fine-grained evaluation for characterizing multimodal safety behavior beyond a single binary success metric.

What we could verify

These are the protocol signals we could actually recover from the available paper metadata. Use them to decide whether this paper is worth deeper reading.

Human Feedback Types

missing

None explicit

No explicit feedback protocol extracted.

"Safety evaluation of multimodal large language models requires tracking not only whether an attack succeeds, but also how the interaction unfolds across turns and input modalities."

Evaluation Modes

partial

Automatic Metrics

Includes extracted eval setup.

"Safety evaluation of multimodal large language models requires tracking not only whether an attack succeeds, but also how the interaction unfolds across turns and input modalities."

Quality Controls

missing

Not reported

No explicit QC controls found.

"Safety evaluation of multimodal large language models requires tracking not only whether an attack succeeds, but also how the interaction unfolds across turns and input modalities."

Benchmarks / Datasets

missing

Not extracted

No benchmark anchors detected.

"Safety evaluation of multimodal large language models requires tracking not only whether an attack succeeds, but also how the interaction unfolds across turns and input modalities."

Reported Metrics

partial

Jailbreak success rate

Useful for evaluation criteria comparison.

"Safety evaluation of multimodal large language models requires tracking not only whether an attack succeeds, but also how the interaction unfolds across turns and input modalities."

Benchmarks and datasets

No benchmark or dataset names were extracted from the available abstract.

Reported metrics

jailbreak success rate
Human feedback details
Uses human feedback
No
Feedback types
None
Rater population
Not reported
Unit of annotation
Trajectory (inferred)
Expertise required
General
Evaluation details
Evaluation modes
Automatic Metrics
Agentic eval
Long Horizon, Web Browsing
Quality controls
Not reported
Evidence quality
Low
Use this page as
Background context only

Research brief

Metadata summary

Safety evaluation of multimodal large language models requires tracking not only whether an attack succeeds, but also how the interaction unfolds across turns and input modalities.

Based on abstract + metadata only. Check the source paper before making high-confidence protocol decisions.

Key takeaways

  • Safety evaluation of multimodal large language models requires tracking not only whether an attack succeeds, but also how the interaction unfolds across turns and input modalities.
  • We present MUSE (Multimodal Unified Safety Evaluation), an open-source, browser-based, run-centric platform for multimodal safety evaluation.
  • MUSE treats each attack run as the persistent unit of execution, inspection, and analysis, preserving its configuration, multi-turn trajectory, delivered modalities and media, target responses, and safety judgments.

Researcher actions

  • Compare this paper against nearby papers in the same arXiv category before using it for protocol decisions.
  • Validate inferred eval signals (Automatic metrics) against the full paper.
  • Use related-paper links to find stronger protocol-specific references.

Caveats

  • Generated from abstract + metadata only; no PDF parsing.
  • Signals below are heuristic and may miss details reported outside the abstract.

Recommended queries

Contribution summary

  • Safety evaluation of multimodal large language models requires tracking not only whether an attack succeeds, but also how the interaction unfolds across turns and input modalities.
  • We present MUSE (Multimodal Unified Safety Evaluation), an open-source, browser-based, run-centric platform for multimodal safety evaluation.
  • Across 11,700 evaluations on six multimodal LLMs, direct text-only requests yield only 3.1% macro hard ASR and 4.4% soft ASR, while iterative attack procedures are substantially more effective.

Why it matters for eval

  • We present MUSE (Multimodal Unified Safety Evaluation), an open-source, browser-based, run-centric platform for multimodal safety evaluation.
  • Across 11,700 evaluations on six multimodal LLMs, direct text-only requests yield only 3.1% macro hard ASR and 4.4% soft ASR, while iterative attack procedures are substantially more effective.

Researcher checklist

  • Human feedback protocol is explicit

    No explicit human feedback protocol detected.

  • Evaluation mode is explicit

    Detected: Automatic Metrics

  • Quality control reporting appears

    No calibration/adjudication/IAA control explicitly detected.

  • Benchmark or dataset anchors are present

    No benchmark/dataset anchor extracted from abstract.

  • Metric reporting is present

    Detected: jailbreak success rate