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PIDP-Attack: Combining Prompt Injection with Database Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems

Haozhen Wang, Haoyue Liu, Jionghao Zhu, Zhichao Wang, Yongxin Guo, Xiaoying Tang · Mar 26, 2026 · Citations: 0

How to use this page

Low trust

Use this as background context only. Do not make protocol decisions from this page alone.

Best use

Background context only

What to verify

Validate the evaluation procedure and quality controls in the full paper before operational use.

Evidence quality

Low

Derived from extracted protocol signals and abstract evidence.

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications. However, their practical deployment is often hindered by issues such as outdated knowledge and the tendency to generate hallucinations. To address these limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have been introduced, enhancing LLMs with external, up-to-date knowledge sources. Despite their advantages, RAG systems remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, with data poisoning emerging as a prominent threat. Existing poisoning-based attacks typically require prior knowledge of the user's specific queries, limiting their flexibility and real-world applicability. In this work, we propose PIDP-Attack, a novel compound attack that integrates prompt injection with database poisoning in RAG. By appending malicious characters to queries at inference time and injecting a limited number of poisoned passages into the retrieval database, our method can effectively manipulate LLM response to arbitrary query without prior knowledge of the user's actual query. Experimental evaluations across three benchmark datasets (Natural Questions, HotpotQA, MS-MARCO) and eight LLMs demonstrate that PIDP-Attack consistently outperforms the original PoisonedRAG. Specifically, our method improves attack success rates by 4% to 16% on open-domain QA tasks while maintaining high retrieval precision, proving that the compound attack strategy is both necessary and highly effective.

Abstract-only analysis — low confidence

All signals on this page are inferred from the abstract only and may be inaccurate. Do not use this page as a primary protocol reference.

  • This paper looks adjacent to evaluation work, but not like a strong protocol reference.
  • The available metadata is too thin to trust this as a primary source.

Should You Rely On This Paper?

This paper is adjacent to HFEPX scope and is best used for background context, not as a primary protocol reference.

Best use

Background context only

Use if you need

A benchmark-and-metrics comparison anchor.

Main weakness

This paper looks adjacent to evaluation work, but not like a strong protocol reference.

Trust level

Low

Usefulness score

5/100 • Low

Treat as adjacent context, not a core eval-method reference.

Human Feedback Signal

Not explicit in abstract metadata

Evaluation Signal

Detected

Usefulness for eval research

Adjacent candidate

Extraction confidence 45%

What We Could Verify

These are the protocol signals we could actually recover from the available paper metadata. Use them to decide whether this paper is worth deeper reading.

Human Feedback Types

missing

None explicit

No explicit feedback protocol extracted.

"Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications."

Evaluation Modes

partial

Automatic Metrics

Includes extracted eval setup.

"Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications."

Quality Controls

missing

Not reported

No explicit QC controls found.

"Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications."

Benchmarks / Datasets

partial

NQ, HotpotQA, MS MARCO

Useful for quick benchmark comparison.

"Experimental evaluations across three benchmark datasets (Natural Questions, HotpotQA, MS-MARCO) and eight LLMs demonstrate that PIDP-Attack consistently outperforms the original PoisonedRAG."

Reported Metrics

partial

Precision

Useful for evaluation criteria comparison.

"Specifically, our method improves attack success rates by 4% to 16% on open-domain QA tasks while maintaining high retrieval precision, proving that the compound attack strategy is both necessary and highly effective."

Human Feedback Details

  • Uses human feedback: No
  • Feedback types: None
  • Rater population: Not reported
  • Expertise required: General

Evaluation Details

  • Evaluation modes: Automatic Metrics
  • Agentic eval: None
  • Quality controls: Not reported
  • Evidence quality: Low
  • Use this page as: Background context only

Protocol And Measurement Signals

Benchmarks / Datasets

NQHotpotQAMS MARCO

Reported Metrics

precision

Research Brief

Metadata summary

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications.

Based on abstract + metadata only. Check the source paper before making high-confidence protocol decisions.

Key Takeaways

  • Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications.
  • However, their practical deployment is often hindered by issues such as outdated knowledge and the tendency to generate hallucinations.
  • To address these limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have been introduced, enhancing LLMs with external, up-to-date knowledge sources.

Researcher Actions

  • Compare this paper against nearby papers in the same arXiv category before using it for protocol decisions.
  • Check the full text for explicit evaluation design choices (raters, protocol, and metrics).
  • Use related-paper links to find stronger protocol-specific references.

Caveats

  • Generated from abstract + metadata only; no PDF parsing.
  • Signals below are heuristic and may miss details reported outside the abstract.

Recommended Queries

Research Summary

Contribution Summary

  • In this work, we propose PIDP-Attack, a novel compound attack that integrates prompt injection with database poisoning in RAG.
  • Experimental evaluations across three benchmark datasets (Natural Questions, HotpotQA, MS-MARCO) and eight LLMs demonstrate that PIDP-Attack consistently outperforms the original PoisonedRAG.
  • Specifically, our method improves attack success rates by 4% to 16% on open-domain QA tasks while maintaining high retrieval precision, proving that the compound attack strategy is both necessary and highly effective.

Why It Matters For Eval

  • Experimental evaluations across three benchmark datasets (Natural Questions, HotpotQA, MS-MARCO) and eight LLMs demonstrate that PIDP-Attack consistently outperforms the original PoisonedRAG.

Researcher Checklist

  • Gap: Human feedback protocol is explicit

    No explicit human feedback protocol detected.

  • Pass: Evaluation mode is explicit

    Detected: Automatic Metrics

  • Gap: Quality control reporting appears

    No calibration/adjudication/IAA control explicitly detected.

  • Pass: Benchmark or dataset anchors are present

    Detected: NQ, HotpotQA, MS MARCO

  • Pass: Metric reporting is present

    Detected: precision

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