Human Feedback Types
missingNone explicit
No explicit feedback protocol extracted.
"Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users."
HFEPX · Eval paper review
Mengxiao Wang, Mahbub Alam, Kalyan Nakka, Nitesh Saxena
Published
Nov 19, 2026
Citations
0
Trust level
Low
Usefulness score
0/100 (Low)
Extraction confidence
15% (Low)
Derived from extracted protocol signals and abstract evidence.
Rater population
Not reported
Signals refreshed
Nov 19, 2026
This paper is adjacent to HFEPX scope and is best used for background context, not as a primary protocol reference.
Use this as background context only. Do not make protocol decisions from this page alone.
All signals on this page are inferred from the abstract only and may be inaccurate. Do not use this page as a primary protocol reference.
Best use
Background context only
Use if you need
A secondary eval reference to pair with stronger protocol papers.
What to verify
Read the full paper before copying any benchmark, metric, or protocol choices.
Main weakness
This paper looks adjacent to evaluation work, but not like a strong protocol reference.
Treat as adjacent context, not a core eval-method reference.
If you are doing eval pipeline work, start here
Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users. News media reports routinely describe failures of these agents (e.g., Replit's coding agent deleting a production database), but a report often only says what went wrong and rarely (in)validates the incident or finds its root cause. Incident catalogs collect these reports, and benchmarks record whether agents fail, but neither replicates an incident nor tests the cause its report might identify. In this paper, we present ROGUE-AI (Replication of Agentic Security Events: Audit and Investigation), a multi-agent framework that closes the above gap and rebuilds each reported incident offline together with a matched control that lacks only the blamed cause, and runs agents on both. Our results suggest that ROGUE-AI is able to reproduce the reported harm in 89% of its 108 attempted replications. Agents built on five current GPT, Claude, Gemini and DeepSeek models made the reported mistake in 18% to 33% of runs, against at most 1% without the blamed cause. Of the 72 incidents with real-world harm, 62 had no underlying attacker, and in these, agents did what their task asked for but missed an ordinary hazard, such as a database shared with the live site. Replications without an attacker caused more harm than replications of prompt injection for all five models. Defenses against prompt injection look for injected instructions, but these replications contain none. Further, a warning after each tool output that names the hazard and its consequence lowered harm for all five models, whereas a note of the same length that does not mention the hazard left most of the harm in place. Built from real incidents, the ROGUE-AI replications form a reusable audit framework that vendors can rerun before each new release.
These are the protocol signals we could actually recover from the available paper metadata. Use them to decide whether this paper is worth deeper reading.
None explicit
No explicit feedback protocol extracted.
"Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users."
None explicit
Validate eval design from full paper text.
"Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users."
Not reported
No explicit QC controls found.
"Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users."
Not extracted
No benchmark anchors detected.
"Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users."
Not extracted
No metric anchors detected.
"Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users."
No benchmark or dataset names were extracted from the available abstract.
No metric terms were extracted from the available abstract.
Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users.
Based on abstract + metadata only. Check the source paper before making high-confidence protocol decisions.
Human feedback protocol is explicit
No explicit human feedback protocol detected.
Evaluation mode is explicit
No clear evaluation mode extracted.
Quality control reporting appears
No calibration/adjudication/IAA control explicitly detected.
Benchmark or dataset anchors are present
No benchmark/dataset anchor extracted from abstract.
Metric reporting is present
No metric terms extracted.