Skip to content
OpenTrain AIFor AI Companies

HFEPX · Eval paper review

Replication of Agentic Security Events: Audit and Investigation (ROGUE-AI)

Mengxiao Wang, Mahbub Alam, Kalyan Nakka, Nitesh Saxena

Published

Nov 19, 2026

Citations

0

Trust level

Low

Usefulness score

0/100 (Low)

Extraction confidence

15% (Low)

Derived from extracted protocol signals and abstract evidence.

Rater population

Not reported

Signals refreshed

Nov 19, 2026

Should you rely on this paper?

This paper is adjacent to HFEPX scope and is best used for background context, not as a primary protocol reference.

Use this as background context only. Do not make protocol decisions from this page alone.

Best use

Background context only

Use if you need

A secondary eval reference to pair with stronger protocol papers.

What to verify

Read the full paper before copying any benchmark, metric, or protocol choices.

Main weakness

This paper looks adjacent to evaluation work, but not like a strong protocol reference.

Human feedback signal
Not explicit
Not explicit in abstract metadata
Evaluation signal
Detected
Eval setup described
Usefulness for eval research
0/100
Adjacent candidate

Treat as adjacent context, not a core eval-method reference.

Abstract

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users. News media reports routinely describe failures of these agents (e.g., Replit's coding agent deleting a production database), but a report often only says what went wrong and rarely (in)validates the incident or finds its root cause. Incident catalogs collect these reports, and benchmarks record whether agents fail, but neither replicates an incident nor tests the cause its report might identify. In this paper, we present ROGUE-AI (Replication of Agentic Security Events: Audit and Investigation), a multi-agent framework that closes the above gap and rebuilds each reported incident offline together with a matched control that lacks only the blamed cause, and runs agents on both. Our results suggest that ROGUE-AI is able to reproduce the reported harm in 89% of its 108 attempted replications. Agents built on five current GPT, Claude, Gemini and DeepSeek models made the reported mistake in 18% to 33% of runs, against at most 1% without the blamed cause. Of the 72 incidents with real-world harm, 62 had no underlying attacker, and in these, agents did what their task asked for but missed an ordinary hazard, such as a database shared with the live site. Replications without an attacker caused more harm than replications of prompt injection for all five models. Defenses against prompt injection look for injected instructions, but these replications contain none. Further, a warning after each tool output that names the hazard and its consequence lowered harm for all five models, whereas a note of the same length that does not mention the hazard left most of the harm in place. Built from real incidents, the ROGUE-AI replications form a reusable audit framework that vendors can rerun before each new release.

What we could verify

These are the protocol signals we could actually recover from the available paper metadata. Use them to decide whether this paper is worth deeper reading.

Human Feedback Types

missing

None explicit

No explicit feedback protocol extracted.

"Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users."

Evaluation Modes

missing

None explicit

Validate eval design from full paper text.

"Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users."

Quality Controls

missing

Not reported

No explicit QC controls found.

"Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users."

Benchmarks / Datasets

missing

Not extracted

No benchmark anchors detected.

"Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users."

Reported Metrics

missing

Not extracted

No metric anchors detected.

"Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users."

Benchmarks and datasets

No benchmark or dataset names were extracted from the available abstract.

Reported metrics

No metric terms were extracted from the available abstract.

Human feedback details
Uses human feedback
No
Feedback types
None
Rater population
Not reported
Expertise required
Coding
Evaluation details
Evaluation modes
None
Agentic eval
Multi Agent
Quality controls
Not reported
Evidence quality
Low
Use this page as
Background context only

Research brief

Metadata summary

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users.

Based on abstract + metadata only. Check the source paper before making high-confidence protocol decisions.

Key takeaways

  • Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users.
  • News media reports routinely describe failures of these agents (e.g., Replit's coding agent deleting a production database), but a report often only says what went wrong and rarely (in)validates the incident or finds its root cause.
  • Incident catalogs collect these reports, and benchmarks record whether agents fail, but neither replicates an incident nor tests the cause its report might identify.

Researcher actions

  • Compare this paper against nearby papers in the same arXiv category before using it for protocol decisions.
  • Check the full text for explicit evaluation design choices (raters, protocol, and metrics).
  • Use related-paper links to find stronger protocol-specific references.

Caveats

  • Generated from abstract + metadata only; no PDF parsing.
  • Signals below are heuristic and may miss details reported outside the abstract.

Recommended queries

Contribution summary

  • Agents based on large language models (LLMs) can now delete files and send payments on behalf of their users.
  • News media reports routinely describe failures of these agents (e.g., Replit's coding agent deleting a production database), but a report often only says what went wrong and rarely (in)validates the incident or finds its root cause.

Why it matters for eval

  • Incident catalogs collect these reports, and benchmarks record whether agents fail, but neither replicates an incident nor tests the cause its report might identify.

Researcher checklist

  • Human feedback protocol is explicit

    No explicit human feedback protocol detected.

  • Evaluation mode is explicit

    No clear evaluation mode extracted.

  • Quality control reporting appears

    No calibration/adjudication/IAA control explicitly detected.

  • Benchmark or dataset anchors are present

    No benchmark/dataset anchor extracted from abstract.

  • Metric reporting is present

    No metric terms extracted.