Human Feedback Types
strongCritique Edit
Directly usable for protocol triage.
"Previous work has shown that alignment training on individual LLM agents can fail to transfer to multi-agent settings."
HFEPX · Eval paper review
Siddarth Srinivasan, Morgan Jane Matthews, Jascha Sohl-Dickstein, Erik Jones
Published
Nov 13, 2026
Citations
0
Trust level
Moderate
Usefulness score
40/100 (Low)
Extraction confidence
50% (Moderate)
Derived from extracted protocol signals and abstract evidence.
Rater population
Not reported
Signals refreshed
Nov 13, 2026
This paper is adjacent to HFEPX scope and is best used for background context, not as a primary protocol reference.
Use this for comparison and orientation, not as your only source.
Use this page for context, then validate protocol choices against stronger HFEPX references before implementation decisions.
Best use
Background context only
Use if you need
A secondary eval reference to pair with stronger protocol papers.
What to verify
Read the full paper before copying any benchmark, metric, or protocol choices.
Main weakness
The abstract does not clearly name benchmarks or metrics.
Treat as adjacent context, not a core eval-method reference.
If you are doing eval pipeline work, start here
Previous work has shown that alignment training on individual LLM agents can fail to transfer to multi-agent settings. We investigate the underlying mechanisms for this failure, and explore interventions to preserve alignment transfer to multi-agent LLM teams. We focus on two software-engineering tasks (sepsis triage, a news recommender) and ten consulting-proposal generation tasks. We present four findings: (1) The single-vs-team safety gap does not show a clear trend with more capable models. We find that Anthropic's Mythos Preview shows the largest gap on one of our tasks but the smallest on another; (2) Many natural interventions, such as having agents critique each other's work or coordinate in a group chat, do not reliably bring agent teams back to single-agent alignment behavior; (3) diffusion of responsibility substantially accounts for the safety gap: agents in teams are less likely to proactively check for system-level safety failures and more likely to ignore, rationalize, or deflect responsibility for issues when they arise; (4) having a designated safety lead agent ensure system-level safety, and having a coordinator agent publish a safety specifications document are effective at restoring single-agent alignment. We also release magelab, a multi-agent LLM orchestration and experimentation framework. Our findings can help practitioners design agent teams that successfully preserve the behaviors expected of aligned individual agents.
These are the protocol signals we could actually recover from the available paper metadata. Use them to decide whether this paper is worth deeper reading.
Critique Edit
Directly usable for protocol triage.
"Previous work has shown that alignment training on individual LLM agents can fail to transfer to multi-agent settings."
None explicit
Validate eval design from full paper text.
"Previous work has shown that alignment training on individual LLM agents can fail to transfer to multi-agent settings."
Not reported
No explicit QC controls found.
"Previous work has shown that alignment training on individual LLM agents can fail to transfer to multi-agent settings."
Not extracted
No benchmark anchors detected.
"Previous work has shown that alignment training on individual LLM agents can fail to transfer to multi-agent settings."
Not extracted
No metric anchors detected.
"Previous work has shown that alignment training on individual LLM agents can fail to transfer to multi-agent settings."
No benchmark or dataset names were extracted from the available abstract.
No metric terms were extracted from the available abstract.
Previous work has shown that alignment training on individual LLM agents can fail to transfer to multi-agent settings.
Based on abstract + metadata only. Check the source paper before making high-confidence protocol decisions.
Human feedback protocol is explicit
Detected: Critique Edit
Evaluation mode is explicit
No clear evaluation mode extracted.
Quality control reporting appears
No calibration/adjudication/IAA control explicitly detected.
Benchmark or dataset anchors are present
No benchmark/dataset anchor extracted from abstract.
Metric reporting is present
No metric terms extracted.