HFEPX · Eval paper review
Venkata M Sangaraju, Sudhir Vissa
Published
Oct 5, 2026
Citations
0
Trust level
Low
Usefulness score
40/100 (Low)
Extraction confidence
45% (Low)
Derived from extracted protocol signals and abstract evidence.
Rater population
Not reported
Signals refreshed
Oct 5, 2026
This paper is adjacent to HFEPX scope and is best used for background context, not as a primary protocol reference.
Use this as background context only. Do not make protocol decisions from this page alone.
Use this page for context, then validate protocol choices against stronger HFEPX references before implementation decisions.
Best use
Background context only
Use if you need
Background context only.
What to verify
Read the full paper before copying any benchmark, metric, or protocol choices.
Main weakness
The available metadata is too thin to trust this as a primary source.
Treat as adjacent context, not a core eval-method reference.
If you are doing eval pipeline work, start here
Enterprise AI agents that share a memory store face two unaddressed risks: sensitive data can leak through legitimately computed results the requester could not derive, and departments can silently compute a same-named key performance indicator (KPI) through conflicting logic. Existing agent-memory systems (e.g., MemGPT, Zep, A-MEM) gate retrieval by content, ownership, and role, not derivation, missing a cached insight that embeds a forbidden column. We introduce the Analytical Memory Unit (AMU), a memory schema that attaches a full derivation (lineage) graph to every cached result, gated by a retrieval policy that serves a hit only when the requester is authorised for every column touched. Provided lineage recording is complete, we prove by construction that the policy blocks retrieval of results derived from a sensitive column outside the requester's permissions, at O(n) worst case -- a conditional design guarantee, not an empirical claim, that excludes derived features encoding sensitive information without naming their source. Eliminating measured leakage required 75-90% recorded lineage completeness, so we treat 90% as a conservative deployment target. Across six experiments, lineage-gated retrieval removes the 18.8-25.5% cross-department leakage naive content-gated memory suffers, keeping 81.5-82.6% of memory reuse at 13.8 microsecond worst-case overhead. A real-agent proof-of-concept with LLM-generated SQL is consistent with the guarantee: zero leaks over 9 round-trips, two conflicts caught automatically -- though a feasibility demonstration, not evidence of production viability. This offers a practical governance layer for shared agent memory, complementing source-layer access control and supporting EU AI Act compliance.
These are the protocol signals we could actually recover from the available paper metadata. Use them to decide whether this paper is worth deeper reading.
Demonstrations
Directly usable for protocol triage.
"Enterprise AI agents that share a memory store face two unaddressed risks: sensitive data can leak through legitimately computed results the requester could not derive, and departments can silently compute a same-named key performance indicator (KPI) through conflicting logic."
None explicit
Validate eval design from full paper text.
"Enterprise AI agents that share a memory store face two unaddressed risks: sensitive data can leak through legitimately computed results the requester could not derive, and departments can silently compute a same-named key performance indicator (KPI) through conflicting logic."
Not reported
No explicit QC controls found.
"Enterprise AI agents that share a memory store face two unaddressed risks: sensitive data can leak through legitimately computed results the requester could not derive, and departments can silently compute a same-named key performance indicator (KPI) through conflicting logic."
Not extracted
No benchmark anchors detected.
"Enterprise AI agents that share a memory store face two unaddressed risks: sensitive data can leak through legitimately computed results the requester could not derive, and departments can silently compute a same-named key performance indicator (KPI) through conflicting logic."
Not extracted
No metric anchors detected.
"Enterprise AI agents that share a memory store face two unaddressed risks: sensitive data can leak through legitimately computed results the requester could not derive, and departments can silently compute a same-named key performance indicator (KPI) through conflicting logic."
No benchmark or dataset names were extracted from the available abstract.
No metric terms were extracted from the available abstract.
Enterprise AI agents that share a memory store face two unaddressed risks: sensitive data can leak through legitimately computed results the requester could not derive, and departments can silently compute a same-named key performance indicator (KPI) through conflicting logic.
Based on abstract + metadata only. Check the source paper before making high-confidence protocol decisions.
Human feedback protocol is explicit
Detected: Demonstrations
Evaluation mode is explicit
No clear evaluation mode extracted.
Quality control reporting appears
No calibration/adjudication/IAA control explicitly detected.
Benchmark or dataset anchors are present
No benchmark/dataset anchor extracted from abstract.
Metric reporting is present
No metric terms extracted.
