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Weight space Detection of Backdoors in LoRA Adapters

David Puertolas Merenciano, Ekaterina Vasyagina, Raghav Dixit, Kevin Zhu, Ruizhe Li, Javier Ferrando, Maheep Chaudhary · Feb 16, 2026 · Citations: 0

Abstract

LoRA adapters let users fine-tune large language models (LLMs) efficiently. However, LoRA adapters are shared through open repositories like Hugging Face Hub \citep{huggingface_hub_docs}, making them vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Current detection methods require running the model with test input data -- making them impractical for screening thousands of adapters where the trigger for backdoor behavior is unknown. We detect poisoned adapters by analyzing their weight matrices directly, without running the model -- making our method data-agnostic. Our method extracts simple statistics -- how concentrated the singular values are, their entropy, and the distribution shape -- and flags adapters that deviate from normal patterns. We evaluate the method on 500 LoRA adapters -- 400 clean, and 100 poisoned for Llama-3.2-3B on instruction and reasoning datasets: Alpaca, Dolly, GSM8K, ARC-Challenge, SQuADv2, NaturalQuestions, HumanEval, and GLUE dataset. We achieve 97\% detection accuracy with less than 2\% false positives.

Human Data Lens

  • Uses human feedback: No
  • Feedback types: None
  • Rater population: Unknown
  • Unit of annotation: Unknown
  • Expertise required: Math

Evaluation Lens

  • Evaluation modes: Automatic Metrics
  • Agentic eval: None
  • Quality controls: Not reported
  • Confidence: 0.45
  • Flags: low_signal, possible_false_positive

Research Summary

Contribution Summary

  • LoRA adapters let users fine-tune large language models (LLMs) efficiently.
  • However, LoRA adapters are shared through open repositories like Hugging Face Hub \citep{huggingface_hub_docs}, making them vulnerable to backdoor attacks.
  • Current detection methods require running the model with test input data -- making them impractical for screening thousands of adapters where the trigger for backdoor behavior is unknown.

Why It Matters For Eval

  • We evaluate the method on 500 LoRA adapters -- 400 clean, and 100 poisoned for Llama-3.2-3B on instruction and reasoning datasets: Alpaca, Dolly, GSM8K, ARC-Challenge, SQuADv2, NaturalQuestions, HumanEval, and GLUE dataset.

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