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HFEPX · Eval paper review

SafeReview: Defending LLM-based Review Systems Against Adversarial Hidden Prompts

Yuan Xin, Yixuan Weng, Minjun Zhu, Ying Ling +4 more

Published

Apr 29, 2026

Citations

0

Trust level

Low

Usefulness score

40/100 (Low)

Extraction confidence

45% (Low)

Derived from extracted protocol signals and abstract evidence.

Rater population

Not reported

Signals refreshed

May 28, 2026

Should you rely on this paper?

This paper is adjacent to HFEPX scope and is best used for background context, not as a primary protocol reference.

Use this as background context only. Do not make protocol decisions from this page alone.

Best use

Background context only

Use if you need

Background context only.

What to verify

Read the full paper before copying any benchmark, metric, or protocol choices.

Main weakness

The available metadata is too thin to trust this as a primary source.

Human feedback signal
Detected
From extracted signals
Evaluation signal
Weak or implicit
Validate from full paper
Usefulness for eval research
40/100
Adjacent candidate

Treat as adjacent context, not a core eval-method reference.

Abstract

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into academic peer review, their vulnerability to adversarial hidden prompts, i.e., adversarial instructions embedded in submissions to manipulate outcomes, poses a critical threat to scholarly integrity. We propose SafeReview, a co-evolutionary adversarial training framework for defending LLM-based peer review systems against such attacks. SafeReview jointly trains a Generator model to create sophisticated attack prompts and a Defender model to preserve review integrity under adversarial manipulation. The Generator is optimized to produce increasingly effective prompt injections, while the Defender is strengthened through preference-based training to maintain consistent reviews between clean and attacked submissions. Experimental results show that SafeReview improves robustness against adaptive prompt injection attacks, better preserves paper ranking under attack, and generalizes across attacker architectures compared with static defenses. These results demonstrate the potential of co-evolutionary training as a foundation for securing LLM-assisted peer review.

What we could verify

These are the protocol signals we could actually recover from the available paper metadata. Use them to decide whether this paper is worth deeper reading.

Human Feedback Types

partial

Pairwise Preference

Directly usable for protocol triage.

"As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into academic peer review, their vulnerability to adversarial hidden prompts, i.e., adversarial instructions embedded in submissions to manipulate outcomes, poses a critical threat to scholarly integrity."

Evaluation Modes

missing

None explicit

Validate eval design from full paper text.

"As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into academic peer review, their vulnerability to adversarial hidden prompts, i.e., adversarial instructions embedded in submissions to manipulate outcomes, poses a critical threat to scholarly integrity."

Quality Controls

missing

Not reported

No explicit QC controls found.

"As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into academic peer review, their vulnerability to adversarial hidden prompts, i.e., adversarial instructions embedded in submissions to manipulate outcomes, poses a critical threat to scholarly integrity."

Benchmarks / Datasets

missing

Not extracted

No benchmark anchors detected.

"As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into academic peer review, their vulnerability to adversarial hidden prompts, i.e., adversarial instructions embedded in submissions to manipulate outcomes, poses a critical threat to scholarly integrity."

Reported Metrics

missing

Not extracted

No metric anchors detected.

"As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into academic peer review, their vulnerability to adversarial hidden prompts, i.e., adversarial instructions embedded in submissions to manipulate outcomes, poses a critical threat to scholarly integrity."

Benchmarks and datasets

No benchmark or dataset names were extracted from the available abstract.

Reported metrics

No metric terms were extracted from the available abstract.

Human feedback details
Uses human feedback
Yes
Feedback types
Pairwise Preference
Rater population
Not reported
Unit of annotation
Ranking (inferred)
Expertise required
General
Evaluation details
Evaluation modes
None
Agentic eval
None
Quality controls
Not reported
Evidence quality
Low
Use this page as
Background context only

Research brief

Metadata summary

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into academic peer review, their vulnerability to adversarial hidden prompts, i.e., adversarial instructions embedded in submissions to manipulate outcomes, poses a critical threat to scholarly integrity.

Based on abstract + metadata only. Check the source paper before making high-confidence protocol decisions.

Key takeaways

  • As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into academic peer review, their vulnerability to adversarial hidden prompts, i.e., adversarial instructions embedded in submissions to manipulate outcomes, poses a critical threat to scholarly integrity.
  • We propose SafeReview, a co-evolutionary adversarial training framework for defending LLM-based peer review systems against such attacks.
  • SafeReview jointly trains a Generator model to create sophisticated attack prompts and a Defender model to preserve review integrity under adversarial manipulation.

Researcher actions

  • Compare this paper against nearby papers in the same arXiv category before using it for protocol decisions.
  • Check the full text for explicit evaluation design choices (raters, protocol, and metrics).
  • Use related-paper links to find stronger protocol-specific references.

Caveats

  • Generated from abstract + metadata only; no PDF parsing.
  • Signals below are heuristic and may miss details reported outside the abstract.

Contribution summary

  • We propose SafeReview, a co-evolutionary adversarial training framework for defending LLM-based peer review systems against such attacks.
  • The Generator is optimized to produce increasingly effective prompt injections, while the Defender is strengthened through preference-based training to maintain consistent reviews between clean and attacked submissions.

Why it matters for eval

  • The Generator is optimized to produce increasingly effective prompt injections, while the Defender is strengthened through preference-based training to maintain consistent reviews between clean and attacked submissions.

Researcher checklist

  • Human feedback protocol is explicit

    Detected: Pairwise Preference

  • Evaluation mode is explicit

    No clear evaluation mode extracted.

  • Quality control reporting appears

    No calibration/adjudication/IAA control explicitly detected.

  • Benchmark or dataset anchors are present

    No benchmark/dataset anchor extracted from abstract.

  • Metric reporting is present

    No metric terms extracted.