HFEPX · Eval paper review

Consequentialist Objectives and Catastrophe

Henrik Marklund, Alex Infanger, Benjamin Van Roy

Published

Mar 16, 2026

Citations

Trust level

Low

Usefulness score

40/100 (Low)

Extraction confidence

45% (Low)

Derived from extracted protocol signals and abstract evidence.

Rater population

Not reported

Signals refreshed

Apr 24, 2026

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Should you rely on this paper?

This paper is adjacent to HFEPX scope and is best used for background context, not as a primary protocol reference.

Use this as background context only. Do not make protocol decisions from this page alone.

Low-signal caution for protocol decisions

Use this page for context, then validate protocol choices against stronger HFEPX references before implementation decisions.

The available metadata is too thin to trust this as a primary source.
The abstract does not clearly describe the evaluation setup.
The abstract does not clearly name benchmarks or metrics.

Best use

Background context only

Use if you need

Background context only.

What to verify

Read the full paper before copying any benchmark, metric, or protocol choices.

Main weakness

The available metadata is too thin to trust this as a primary source.

Human feedback signal

Detected

From extracted signals

Evaluation signal

Weak or implicit

Validate from full paper

Usefulness for eval research

40/100

Adjacent candidate

Treat as adjacent context, not a core eval-method reference.

If you are doing eval pipeline work, start here

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Abstract

Because human preferences are too complex to codify, AIs operate with misspecified objectives. Optimizing such objectives often produces undesirable outcomes; this phenomenon is known as reward hacking. Such outcomes are not necessarily catastrophic. Indeed, most examples of reward hacking in previous literature are benign. And typically, objectives can be modified to resolve the issue. We study the prospect of catastrophic outcomes induced by AIs operating in complex environments. We argue that, when capabilities are sufficiently advanced, pursuing a fixed consequentialist objective tends to result in catastrophic outcomes. We formalize this by establishing conditions that provably lead to such outcomes. Under these conditions, simple or random behavior is safe. Catastrophic risk arises due to extraordinary competence rather than incompetence. With a fixed consequentialist objective, avoiding catastrophe requires constraining AI capabilities. In fact, constraining capabilities the right amount not only averts catastrophe but yields valuable outcomes. Our results apply to any objective produced by modern industrial AI development pipelines.

What we could verify

These are the protocol signals we could actually recover from the available paper metadata. Use them to decide whether this paper is worth deeper reading.