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Jailbreaking Frontier Foundation Models Through Intention Deception

Xinhe Wang, Katia Sycara, Yaqi Xie · Apr 27, 2026 · Citations: 0

How to use this page

Provisional trust

This page is a lightweight research summary built from the abstract and metadata while deeper extraction catches up.

Best use

Background context only

What to verify

Read the full paper before copying any benchmark, metric, or protocol choices.

Evidence quality

Provisional

Derived from abstract and metadata only.

Abstract

Large (vision-)language models exhibit remarkable capability but remain highly susceptible to jailbreaking. Existing safety training approaches aim to have the model learn a refusal boundary between safe and unsafe, based on the user's intent. It has been found that this binary training regime often leads to brittleness, since the user intent cannot reliably be evaluated, especially if the attacker obfuscates their intent, and also makes the system seem unhelpful. In response, frontier models, such as GPT-5, have shifted from refusal-based safeguards to safe completion, that aims to maximize helpfulness while obeying safety constraints. However, safe completion could be exploited when a user pretends their intention is benign. Specifically, this intent inversion would be effective in multi-turn conversation, where the attacker has multiple opportunities to reinforce their deceptively benign intent. In this work, we introduce a novel multi-turn jailbreaking method that exploits this vulnerability. Our approach gradually builds conversational trust by simulating benign-seeming intentions and by exploiting the consistency property of the model, ultimately guiding the target model toward harmful, detailed outputs. Most crucially, our approach also uncovered an additional class of model vulnerability that we call para-jailbreaking that has been unnoticed up to now. Para-jailbreaking describes the situation where the model may not reveal harmful direct reply to the attack query, however the information that it reveals is nevertheless harmful. Our contributions are threefold. First, it achieves high success rates against frontier models including GPT-5-thinking and Claude-Sonnet-4.5. Second, our approach revealed and addressed para-jailbreaking harmful output. Third, experiments on multimodal VLM models showed that our approach outperformed state-of-the-art models.

Abstract-only analysis — low confidence

All signals on this page are inferred from the abstract only and may be inaccurate. Do not use this page as a primary protocol reference.

  • This page is still relying on abstract and metadata signals, not a fuller protocol read.

Should You Rely On This Paper?

Signal extraction is still processing. This page currently shows metadata-first guidance until structured protocol fields are ready.

Best use

Background context only

Use if you need

A provisional background reference while structured extraction finishes.

Main weakness

This page is still relying on abstract and metadata signals, not a fuller protocol read.

Trust level

Provisional

Usefulness score

Unavailable

Eval-fit score is unavailable until extraction completes.

Human Feedback Signal

Not explicit in abstract metadata

Evaluation Signal

Weak / implicit signal

Usefulness for eval research

Provisional (processing)

Extraction confidence 0%

What We Could Verify

These are the protocol signals we could actually recover from the available paper metadata. Use them to decide whether this paper is worth deeper reading.

Human Feedback Types

provisional (inferred)

None explicit

No explicit feedback protocol extracted.

"Large (vision-)language models exhibit remarkable capability but remain highly susceptible to jailbreaking."

Evaluation Modes

provisional (inferred)

None explicit

Validate eval design from full paper text.

"Large (vision-)language models exhibit remarkable capability but remain highly susceptible to jailbreaking."

Quality Controls

provisional (inferred)

Not reported

No explicit QC controls found.

"Large (vision-)language models exhibit remarkable capability but remain highly susceptible to jailbreaking."

Benchmarks / Datasets

provisional (inferred)

Not extracted

No benchmark anchors detected.

"Large (vision-)language models exhibit remarkable capability but remain highly susceptible to jailbreaking."

Reported Metrics

provisional (inferred)

Not extracted

No metric anchors detected.

"Large (vision-)language models exhibit remarkable capability but remain highly susceptible to jailbreaking."

Rater Population

provisional (inferred)

Unknown

Rater source not explicitly reported.

"Large (vision-)language models exhibit remarkable capability but remain highly susceptible to jailbreaking."

Human Feedback Details

This page is using abstract-level cues only right now. Treat the signals below as provisional.

  • Potential human-data signal: No explicit human-data keywords detected.
  • Potential benchmark anchors: No benchmark names detected in abstract.
  • Abstract highlights: 3 key sentence(s) extracted below.

Evaluation Details

Evaluation fields are inferred from the abstract only.

  • Potential evaluation modes: No explicit eval keywords detected.
  • Potential metric signals: No metric keywords detected.
  • Confidence: Provisional (metadata-only fallback).

Research Brief

Metadata summary

Large (vision-)language models exhibit remarkable capability but remain highly susceptible to jailbreaking.

Based on abstract + metadata only. Check the source paper before making high-confidence protocol decisions.

Key Takeaways

  • Large (vision-)language models exhibit remarkable capability but remain highly susceptible to jailbreaking.
  • Existing safety training approaches aim to have the model learn a refusal boundary between safe and unsafe, based on the user's intent.
  • It has been found that this binary training regime often leads to brittleness, since the user intent cannot reliably be evaluated, especially if the attacker obfuscates their intent, and also makes the system seem unhelpful.

Researcher Actions

  • Compare this paper against nearby papers in the same arXiv category before using it for protocol decisions.
  • Check the full text for explicit evaluation design choices (raters, protocol, and metrics).
  • Use related-paper links to find stronger protocol-specific references.

Caveats

  • Generated from abstract + metadata only; no PDF parsing.
  • Signals below are heuristic and may miss details reported outside the abstract.

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