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Not All Tokens Are Created Equal: Query-Efficient Jailbreak Fuzzing for LLMs

Wenyu Chen, Xiangtao Meng, Chuanchao Zang, Li Wang, Xinyu Gao, Jianing Wang, Peng Zhan, Zheng Li, Shanqing Guo · Mar 24, 2026 · Citations: 0

How to use this paper page

Coverage: Stale

Use this page to decide whether the paper is strong enough to influence an eval design. It summarizes the abstract plus available structured metadata. If the signal is thin, use it as background context and compare it against stronger hub pages before making protocol choices.

Best use

Background context only

Metadata: Stale

Trust level

Provisional

Signals: Stale

What still needs checking

Structured extraction is still processing; current fields are metadata-first.

Signal confidence unavailable

Abstract

Large Language Models(LLMs) are widely deployed, yet are vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit policy-violating outputs. Although prior studies have uncovered these risks, they typically treat all tokens as equally important during prompt mutation, overlooking the varying contributions of individual tokens to triggering model refusals. Consequently, these attacks introduce substantial redundant searching under query-constrained scenarios, reducing attack efficiency and hindering comprehensive vulnerability assessment. In this work, we conduct a token-level analysis of refusal behavior and observe that token contributions are highly skewed rather than uniform. Moreover, we find strong cross-model consistency in refusal tendencies, enabling the use of a surrogate model to estimate token-level contributions to the target model's refusals. Motivated by these findings, we propose TriageFuzz, a token-aware jailbreak fuzzing framework that adapts the fuzz testing approach with a series of customized designs. TriageFuzz leverages a surrogate model to estimate the contribution of individual tokens to refusal behaviors, enabling the identification of sensitive regions within the prompt. Furthermore, it incorporates a refusal-guided evolutionary strategy that adaptively weights candidate prompts with a lightweight scorer to steer the evolution toward bypassing safety constraints. Extensive experiments on six open-source LLMs and three commercial APIs demonstrate that TriageFuzz achieves comparable attack success rates (ASR) with significantly reduced query costs. Notably, it attains a 90% ASR with over 70% fewer queries compared to baselines. Even under an extremely restrictive budget of 25 queries, TriageFuzz outperforms existing methods, improving ASR by 20-40%.

Use caution before copying this protocol

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  • Structured extraction is still processing; current fields are metadata-first.

HFEPX Relevance Assessment

Signal extraction is still processing. This page currently shows metadata-first guidance until structured protocol fields are ready.

Best use

Background context only

Use if you need

A provisional background reference while structured extraction finishes.

Main weakness

Structured extraction is still processing; current fields are metadata-first.

Trust level

Provisional

Eval-Fit Score

Unavailable

Eval-fit score is unavailable until extraction completes.

Human Feedback Signal

Not explicit in abstract metadata

Evaluation Signal

Weak / implicit signal

HFEPX Fit

Provisional (processing)

Extraction confidence: Provisional

What This Page Found In The Paper

Each field below shows whether the signal looked explicit, partial, or missing in the available metadata. Use this to judge what is safe to trust directly and what still needs full-paper validation.

Human Feedback Types

provisional

None explicit

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

No explicit feedback protocol extracted.

Evidence snippet: Large Language Models(LLMs) are widely deployed, yet are vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit policy-violating outputs.

Evaluation Modes

provisional

None explicit

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

Validate eval design from full paper text.

Evidence snippet: Large Language Models(LLMs) are widely deployed, yet are vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit policy-violating outputs.

Quality Controls

provisional

Not reported

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

No explicit QC controls found.

Evidence snippet: Large Language Models(LLMs) are widely deployed, yet are vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit policy-violating outputs.

Benchmarks / Datasets

provisional

Not extracted

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

No benchmark anchors detected.

Evidence snippet: Large Language Models(LLMs) are widely deployed, yet are vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit policy-violating outputs.

Reported Metrics

provisional

Not extracted

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

No metric anchors detected.

Evidence snippet: Large Language Models(LLMs) are widely deployed, yet are vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit policy-violating outputs.

Rater Population

provisional

Unknown

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

Rater source not explicitly reported.

Evidence snippet: Large Language Models(LLMs) are widely deployed, yet are vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit policy-violating outputs.

Human Data Lens

This page is using abstract-level cues only right now. Treat the signals below as provisional.

  • Potential human-data signal: No explicit human-data keywords detected.
  • Potential benchmark anchors: No benchmark names detected in abstract.
  • Abstract highlights: 3 key sentence(s) extracted below.

Evaluation Lens

Evaluation fields are inferred from the abstract only.

  • Potential evaluation modes: No explicit eval keywords detected.
  • Potential metric signals: No metric keywords detected.
  • Confidence: Provisional (metadata-only fallback).

Research Brief

Metadata summary

Large Language Models(LLMs) are widely deployed, yet are vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit policy-violating outputs.

Based on abstract + metadata only. Check the source paper before making high-confidence protocol decisions.

Key Takeaways

  • Large Language Models(LLMs) are widely deployed, yet are vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit policy-violating outputs.
  • Although prior studies have uncovered these risks, they typically treat all tokens as equally important during prompt mutation, overlooking the varying contributions of individual tokens to triggering model refusals.
  • Consequently, these attacks introduce substantial redundant searching under query-constrained scenarios, reducing attack efficiency and hindering comprehensive vulnerability assessment.

Researcher Actions

  • Compare this paper against nearby papers in the same arXiv category before using it for protocol decisions.
  • Check the full text for explicit evaluation design choices (raters, protocol, and metrics).
  • Use related-paper links to find stronger protocol-specific references.

Caveats

  • Generated from abstract + metadata only; no PDF parsing.
  • Signals below are heuristic and may miss details reported outside the abstract.

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