From Liar Paradox to Incongruent Sets: A Normal Form for Self-Reference

Use this page to decide whether the paper is strong enough to influence an eval design. It summarizes the abstract plus available structured metadata. If the signal is thin, use it as background context and compare it against stronger hub pages before making protocol choices.

Abstract

We introduce incongruent normal form (INF), a structural representation for self-referential semantic sentences. An INF replaces a self-referential sentence with a finite family of non-self-referential sentences that are individually satisfiable but not jointly satisfiable. This transformation isolates the semantic obstruction created by self-reference while preserving classical semantics locally and is accompanied by correctness theorems characterizing when global inconsistency arises from locally compatible commitments. We then study the role of incongruence as a structural source of semantic informativeness. Using a minimal model-theoretic notion of informativeness-understood as the ability of sentences to distinguish among admissible models-we show that semantic completeness precludes informativeness, while incongruence preserves it. Moreover, incongruence is not confined to paradoxical constructions: any consistent incomplete first-order theory admits finite incongruent families arising from incompatible complete extensions. In this sense, incompleteness manifests structurally as locally realizable but globally incompatible semantic commitments, providing a minimal formal basis for semantic knowledge. Finally, we introduce a quantitative semantic framework. In a canonical finite semantic-state setting, we model semantic commitments as Boolean functions and define a Fourier-analytic notion of semantic energy based on total influence. We derive uncertainty-style bounds relating semantic determinacy, informativeness, and spectral simplicity, and establish a matrix inequality bounding aggregate semantic variance by total semantic energy. These results show quantitatively that semantic informativeness cannot collapse into a single determinate state without unbounded energy cost, identifying incongruence as a fundamental structural and quantitative feature of semantic representation.