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Depth Charge: Jailbreak Large Language Models from Deep Safety Attention Heads

Jinman Wu, Yi Xie, Shiqian Zhao, Xiaofeng Chen · Mar 6, 2026 · Citations: 0

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Coverage: Stale

Use this page to decide whether the paper is strong enough to influence an eval design. It summarizes the abstract plus available structured metadata. If the signal is thin, use it as background context and compare it against stronger hub pages before making protocol choices.

Best use

Background context only

Metadata: Stale

Trust level

Provisional

Signals: Stale

What still needs checking

Structured extraction is still processing; current fields are metadata-first.

Signal confidence unavailable

Abstract

Currently, open-sourced large language models (OSLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative performance. However, as their structure and weights are made public, they are exposed to jailbreak attacks even after alignment. Existing attacks operate primarily at shallow levels, such as the prompt or embedding level, and often fail to expose vulnerabilities rooted in deeper model components, which creates a false sense of security for successful defense. In this paper, we propose \textbf{\underline{S}}afety \textbf{\underline{A}}ttention \textbf{\underline{H}}ead \textbf{\underline{A}}ttack (\textbf{SAHA}), an attention-head-level jailbreak framework that explores the vulnerability in deeper but insufficiently aligned attention heads. SAHA contains two novel designs. Firstly, we reveal that deeper attention layers introduce more vulnerability against jailbreak attacks. Based on this finding, \textbf{SAHA} introduces \textit{Ablation-Impact Ranking} head selection strategy to effectively locate the most vital layer for unsafe output. Secondly, we introduce a boundary-aware perturbation method, \textit{i.e. Layer-Wise Perturbation}, to probe the generation of unsafe content with minimal perturbation to the attention. This constrained perturbation guarantees higher semantic relevance with the target intent while ensuring evasion. Extensive experiments show the superiority of our method: SAHA improves ASR by 14\% over SOTA baselines, revealing the vulnerability of the attack surface on the attention head. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SAHA.

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  • Structured extraction is still processing; current fields are metadata-first.

HFEPX Relevance Assessment

Signal extraction is still processing. This page currently shows metadata-first guidance until structured protocol fields are ready.

Best use

Background context only

Use if you need

A provisional background reference while structured extraction finishes.

Main weakness

Structured extraction is still processing; current fields are metadata-first.

Trust level

Provisional

Eval-Fit Score

Unavailable

Eval-fit score is unavailable until extraction completes.

Human Feedback Signal

Not explicit in abstract metadata

Evaluation Signal

Weak / implicit signal

HFEPX Fit

Provisional (processing)

Extraction confidence: Provisional

What This Page Found In The Paper

Each field below shows whether the signal looked explicit, partial, or missing in the available metadata. Use this to judge what is safe to trust directly and what still needs full-paper validation.

Human Feedback Types

provisional

None explicit

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

No explicit feedback protocol extracted.

Evidence snippet: Currently, open-sourced large language models (OSLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative performance.

Evaluation Modes

provisional

None explicit

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

Validate eval design from full paper text.

Evidence snippet: Currently, open-sourced large language models (OSLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative performance.

Quality Controls

provisional

Not reported

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

No explicit QC controls found.

Evidence snippet: Currently, open-sourced large language models (OSLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative performance.

Benchmarks / Datasets

provisional

Not extracted

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

No benchmark anchors detected.

Evidence snippet: Currently, open-sourced large language models (OSLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative performance.

Reported Metrics

provisional

Not extracted

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

No metric anchors detected.

Evidence snippet: Currently, open-sourced large language models (OSLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative performance.

Rater Population

provisional

Unknown

Confidence: Provisional Best-effort inference

Rater source not explicitly reported.

Evidence snippet: Currently, open-sourced large language models (OSLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative performance.

Human Data Lens

This page is using abstract-level cues only right now. Treat the signals below as provisional.

  • Potential human-data signal: No explicit human-data keywords detected.
  • Potential benchmark anchors: No benchmark names detected in abstract.
  • Abstract highlights: 3 key sentence(s) extracted below.

Evaluation Lens

Evaluation fields are inferred from the abstract only.

  • Potential evaluation modes: No explicit eval keywords detected.
  • Potential metric signals: No metric keywords detected.
  • Confidence: Provisional (metadata-only fallback).

Research Brief

Metadata summary

Currently, open-sourced large language models (OSLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative performance.

Based on abstract + metadata only. Check the source paper before making high-confidence protocol decisions.

Key Takeaways

  • Currently, open-sourced large language models (OSLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative performance.
  • However, as their structure and weights are made public, they are exposed to jailbreak attacks even after alignment.
  • Existing attacks operate primarily at shallow levels, such as the prompt or embedding level, and often fail to expose vulnerabilities rooted in deeper model components, which creates a false sense of security for successful defense.

Researcher Actions

  • Compare this paper against nearby papers in the same arXiv category before using it for protocol decisions.
  • Check the full text for explicit evaluation design choices (raters, protocol, and metrics).
  • Use related-paper links to find stronger protocol-specific references.

Caveats

  • Generated from abstract + metadata only; no PDF parsing.
  • Signals below are heuristic and may miss details reported outside the abstract.

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