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Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing

Carmela Troncoso, Mathias Payer, Jean‐Pierre Hubaux, Marcel Salathé, James R. Larus +29 morePublished May 25, 2020
DOI Publisher
Researcher verdict
Context only
Use as context only
Benchmark evidence
Missing
Not verified yet
Time to first repro
A few days
Plan setup time
Risk flags
2
Review before use

Abstract

Domain fit: Niche / domain-specific · No strong AI-core implementation/artifact signals were detected from current providers.

This document describes and analyzes a system for secure and privacy-preserving proximity tracing at large scale. This system, referred to as DP3T, provides a technological foundation to help slow the spread of SARS-CoV-2 by simplifying and accelerating the process of notifying people who might have been exposed to the virus so that they can take appropriate measures to break its transmission chain. The system aims to minimise privacy and security risks for individuals and communities and guarantee the highest level of data protection. The goal of our proximity tracing system is to determine who has been in close physical proximity to a COVID-19 positive person and thus exposed to the virus, without revealing the contact's identity or where the contact occurred. To achieve this goal, users run a smartphone app that continually broadcasts an ephemeral, pseudo-random ID representing the user's phone and also records the pseudo-random IDs observed from smartphones in close proximity. When a patient is diagnosed with COVID-19, she can upload pseudo-random IDs previously broadcast from her phone to a central server. Prior to the upload, all data remains exclusively on the user's phone. Other users' apps can use data from the server to locally estimate whether the device's owner was exposed to the virus through close-range physical proximity to a COVID-19 positive person who has uploaded their data. In case the app detects a high risk, it will inform the user.

Results and benchmarks

Freshness tier: cold
This document describes and analyzes a system for secure and privacy-preserving proximity tracing at large scale.

Implementation

No direct implementation yet

Maintained implementation evidence is not confirmed for this paper yet.

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Implementation evidence summary
Confidence: low

Recommendation evidence is currently too limited for a maintained-repo choice. Use Implementation Status and Reproduction Path for a practical baseline plan.

Reproduction risks
  • Estimate is based on paper-only reproduction flow

Reproduction readiness

Time to first repro: days
Last checked: Aug 23, 2026

No repo

No verified implementation available

  • No maintained repository has been identified for this paper. Check adjacent implementations or HF artifacts below.

Hardware requirements

  • Expect multi-day setup/compute for meaningful reproduction based on current guidance.

Hugging Face artifacts

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Research context

157

Citations

0

References

Tasks

Upload, Phone, Computer science, Contact tracing, Tracing, Internet privacy, Encryption, Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)

Methods

None detected

Domains

Computer security

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